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INTRODUCrION

The Supreme Court of Texas recently denied rehearing Rogers v.
Ricane Enterprises, Inc.,' thereby reaffirming their restriction of the
Davis doctrine, a 70-year-old principle that allowed a mineral lease to
terminate when the operator completely abandoned the purpose of
the mineral lease.2
Although the Davis doctrine itself is a narrow rule of Texas oil and
gas law, and rarely applied today, the questions raised in Rogers v.
Ricane expose the tenuous foundation of oil and gas law built in large
measure on handshake deals 3 and good will. The law of oil and gas is
1. 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994) (This is the Supreme Court of Texas's review of the
remanded decision. The Supreme Court of Texas previously reversed and remanded
the case in 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989)).
2. Texas Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W. 304, 306 (Tex. 1923).
3. One of the most notorious "handshake deals" of recent years was the one at
issue in Texaco v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dism'd., 485 U.S. 994 (1988). Texaco was accused of tortious
interference with an agreement between Getty and Pennzoil which had not yet been
reduced to a written contract. Joe Jamail, attorney for Pennzoil, successfully argued
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based on the uncomfortable marriage of contract and property law.
Rogers v. Ricane illustrates the confusion that can arise when a court
applies these principles. This comment examines the difficulty Texas
courts have intrepreting oil and gas partial assignments, which they
may do by looking at the writing itself against the backdrop of common industry practice. First, the article reviews Texas law in this area
and then looks at the Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises,Inc. decisions.4
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

A.

Mineral Conveyances

In Rogers v. Ricane, the court interpreted the two most common
instruments used to transfer mineral interests, the oil and gas lease,
and the assignment.
1. The oil and gas lease is both a contract and a conveyance.
The oil and gas lease, like a conveyance, transfers an interest
in
5
property, but like a contract, contains conditions and covenants.
The determinable fee created by an oil and gas lease will revert to
the grantor upon the failure of the lessee to obtain production during the primary term, or failure to timely pay delay rentals.
"Leases" generally provide that they will remain in force after the6
primary term as long as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities.
The lease's defeasing condition is the lessee's permanent cessation
of mineral production.
As early as 1929, the Supreme Court of Texas described six tenets of
the oil and gas lease it considered settled: 1) the lease acts as a conveyance of minerals in place; 2) the estate conveyed is a determinable fee;
3) the estate of the lessee, or his assigns, does not survive abandonment; 4) the lease contains an implied covenant to develop and produce; 5) breach of an implied duty to operate reasonably did not act to
terminate the lease; and 6) the remedy for breach of an implied covenant is damages except where, under extraordinary circumstances,
to the jury that this "handshake deal" had as much validity as a written commemoration of the agreement. See Michael Ansaldi, Texaco, Pennzoil and the Revolt of the
Masses: A Contracts Postmortem, 27 Hous. L. REV. 733 (1990).
4. 775 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987), rev'd and remanded, 772 S.W.2d
76 (Tex. 1989); 852 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993) (on remand), rev'd, 884
S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
5. EUGENE 0. KuNTz ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 107-08
(1st ed. 1986) [hereinafter KuNTz].
6. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982). Cherokee reiterated "[t]he term 'lease' when used in an oil and gas context is a misnomer..... The common oil and gas lease creates a determinable fee. It vests the lessee
with title to oil and gas in place." Id.
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there is no adequate remedy at law, in which case the aggrieved party
may seek a conditional decree. 7
a. The oil and gas lease, like a contract,
includes express covenants.
Express covenants in an oil and gas lease may range from the promise to repair unnecessary surface damage to the promise to drill a certain number of wells within a given period of time. The modern oil
and gas lease contains many express covenants, including promises to
pay royalties, to warrant title, and to surrender title upon termination
of the interest. The remedy for breach of express covenants is an action for contract damages.
b. The oil and gas lease also includes implied covenants.
Courts have determined that the unique relationship between the
lessor and lessee under an oil and gas lease imposes implied duties on
the parties. The number of implied covenants varies according to
court and jurisdiction. Generally, courts required the lessee to act as a
reasonable, prudent operator. This imposes a duty to prevent drainage from persons drilling on adjacent tracts, the duty to explore (in
some jurisdictions), the duty to further develop the minerals, the duty
to market the minerals, the duty to seek favorable administrative action, and the duty to operate reasonably. 8 Like the remedy for breach
of an express covenant, the remedy for breach of an implied covenant
is an action for contract damages.
Public policy seems to be the central premise of implied covenants.
For example, during the early days of mineral development, the rule
of capture allowed individuals to drain oil that had migrated from beneath adjacent tracts with impunity.9 As more landowners became
aware of the treasures lurking beneath the surface, courts began to
limit the rule of capture by applying the fair share principle.'° The fair
share principle states every landowner is entitled to his fair share of
the minerals beneath his land." .
[The American Petroleum Institute] clarified the principle in 1942
[by saying]: "Within reasonable limits, each operator should have
an opportunity equal to that afforded other operators to recover the
7. Waggoner v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex. 1929).
8. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 309-43 (2d ed. 1988); RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.9 (3d ed. 1991).
9. See generally Patrick H. Martin, The Future Course of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases - Past, Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639 (1994); Amoco v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
11. Id. at 569-70 (citing Seldon B. Graham, Jr., Fair Share or Fair Game? Great
Principle, Good Technology - But Pitfalls in Practice, 8 NAT. RES. LAW. 61, 65
(1975)).
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equivalent of the amount of recoverable oil [and gas] underlying his
property. The aim should be to prevent reasonably avoidable drainage of oil 12
and gas across property lines that is not offset by counter
drainage."
With recognition of the fair share principle, courts imposed an implied
duty on the part of the lessee to protect the lease from drainage and
assure that the lessor
would recover his portion of the minerals be13
neath the surface.
Additionally, when minerals were in demand, courts construed the
duty to market at a reasonable price differently than when there was
an abundant market. Courts have sometimes given lessees wide latitude to hold out for the best price, 4 and at other times have subjected
lessees to judicial second guessing. The analysis in Amoco v. First
Baptist Church15 illustrates the difficulties in determining what constitutes a reasonable price. In Amoco, four lessees sold gas from one
well to four different purchasers. Amoco sold gas for seventeen cents
per thousand cubic feet with a redetermination clause allowing for an
increase to seventy-two cents over four years. The other lessees sold
the gas for sixty-two and one half cents per thousand cubic feet, increasing over four years to $1.95 per thousand cubic feet. Amoco
struck a deal with the purchaser for the lower rate in exchange for
assurance the purchaser would buy gas at a higher price from another
nearby Amoco well. Although this agreement benefited the lessee
and his other lessors, it was a detriment to the complaining lessor. As
a remedy, the court awarded the complaining lessor the difference in
the amount of fair market value and royalties received. 6
In Sun Exploration & Production v. Jackson,'7 the Texas Supreme

Court acted to limit the implied covenants. The court held that in
Texas there is no duty to further explore independent of the duty to
develop. The duty to further explore required the lessee to drill exploratory wells even on portions of the leased acreage where there
was no evidence of potential profit. In oil boom days, the duty to
further explore protected the lessor's interest with little risk to the
lessee. Today, however, the viability of the domestic oil industry is
marginal; thus the courts hesitate to impose any significant additional
burdens on lessees. Existing market dynamics determine which covenants courts will imply and how courts enforce them.' 8 The critical
question that remains is whether the lessee acted as a reasonable, prudent operator in light of the circumstances.' 9
12. Id.
13. HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 8.5.
14. See Gazin v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1962).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
IL at 283.
783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989)..
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 9.
LowE, supra note 8, at 306-08.
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c. The difference between conditions and covenants in a mineral
lease is sometimes unclear.
A mineral lease terminates by the failure of its conditions. Under a
lease that contains an unless clause,2" the mineral lease fails if the
lessee does not commence drilling or pay delay rentals during the primary term. 21 Courts construed this provision as a common law limitation on the estate of the lessee.22
Payment of delay rentals keeps the lease alive, but only if payments
are made in the exact amount at the prescribed time. If the lessee's
delay rental payment is a day late or a dollar short, the lease will automatically terminate.23 Courts have strictly enforced the terms of delay
rental clauses. Courts have recognized that the lessee should be given
leeway in determining when and where to drill. The courts have also
recognized the purpose of the oil and gas lease is for parties to profit
by mineral production, and therefore lessees should not hold the lessor's land for speculation without compensation.
During the primary term of a lease, any production holds the lease.
Although the lease typically does not state that production in the secondary term must be in paying quantities, courts have held the purpose of a mineral lease is to make profits for both the lessor and the
lessee. Consequently, courts developed the paying quantities principle as an added condition to the special limitation on the mineral estate.24 Courts apply the paying quantities doctrine, which terminates
a lease despite production, if the production is not in paying quantities
20. A customary provision is as follows:
If operations for drilling are not commenced on said land or on acreage
pooled therewith as above provided on or before one year from this date,
the lease shall then terminate as to both parties, unless on or before such
anniversary date Lessee shall pay or tender to Lessor or to the credit of
Lessor in - Bank at -, Texas ... the sum of - Dollars ($-),
(herein called rentals), which shall cover the privilege of deferring commencement of drilling operations for a period of twelve (12) months. In like
manner and upon like payments or tenders annually, the commencement of
drilling operations may be further deferred for successive periods of twelve
(12) months each during the primary term.
HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 6.3 n.51.
21. "[The delay rental] clause creates a special limitation on the primary term of
the lease by providing that the term of the lease will be cut short automatically upon
the happening of a stated event, the failure to pay rentals or commence drilling operations." KuNTz, supra note 5, at 128.
22. It is important to distinguish that failure to pay rentals does not merely create
a right of forfeiture in the lessor, but also terminates the lease automatically. HEMINGWAY,

supra note 8, § 6.3.

23. Schwatzenberger v. Hunt Trust Estate, 244 N.W.2d 711, 717-18 (N.D. 1976)
(failure to pay proper amount); Young v. Jones, 222 S.W. 691, 693-94 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1920, no writ) (lease terminated when lessee erroneously paid $73.29
rather than $76.25); Gillespie v. Bobo, 271 F. 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1921) (lease terminated where mistaken address caused delay in payment).
24. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
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over a reasonable period of time.2 5 Thus, courts define production
differently in the secondary term, which establishes an additional common law limitation on the lessee's mineral estate.
There are other times when the distinctions between conditions and
covenants become less apparent. In Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co.,26 the mineral lease recited no covenant therein would be construed as a condition.2 7 The court found that failure of the lessee to
pay shut-in royalties was in effect a condition, because the contract
established payment of shut-in royalties as a substitute for production.28 In the absence of production or its substitute, the lease
terminated.2 9
In Grubb v. McAfee,3 ° the lessee ceased operations and removed all
equipment during the term of the lease. Rather than requiring a suit
for breach of contract, the court imposed another common law limitation on the lessee's mineral estate. The court found the lease terminated not by breach of the implied covenant to operate reasonably,
but simply because the lease was abandoned.3 1 The court reasoned it
could ascertain the fact of surrender by the lessee's acts which manifested the lessee's intent.32
Overall, the oil and gas lease has adapted to changes in the industry.
Generally, the lessee drafts the lease, thus leases tend to favor the
mineral developer over the surface owner. In today's oil and gas
lease, express covenants change in response to court decisions.33
These decisions reflect both judicial concern for the welfare of the
lessor and public policy considerations in favor of conservation, avoidance of waste, and certainty of title.
25. The production requirement has been justified as follows,
The rationale for requiring production "in paying quantities" to extend the
lease to its secondary term is convincing. Modem oil and gas leases have an
indefinite secondary term to avoid the problem of termination at the end of
some arbitrary fixed term while it is still profitable to produce the leased
property. From the viewpoint of both lessees and lessors, the lease is an economic transaction. When it no longer is profitable, it should terminate.
Otherwise, lessees would be permitted to speculate with lessors' interests.
LOWE, supra note 8, at 194-95.
26. 171 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1943).
27. Id. at 341.
28. Id. at 342.
29. Id. at 341-42.

30. 212 S.W. 464 (Tex. 1919).
31. Id. at 465.
32. Id. at 468 (quoting Suilt v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 61 S.E. 307, 313 (W. Va.
1908) (citations omitted)).
33. Responses to problems with the oil and gas lease since 1916 have been similar
- reactionary, addressing problems on a case-by-case basis. "Drafting" leases becomes a process of collecting the adverse decisions since the last redraft and revising
the pertinent word, phrase, or clause to respond to the latest episode of judicial hostility toward the document. David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22
TULSA L.J. 445, 441 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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The law is unsettled regarding the scope of rights and
obligations under a mineral lease assignment.

While the oil and gas lease presents a multitude of interpretive
problems, assignments and partial assignments are even worse.
An oil and gas lease may be assigned either in whole or in part.
Upon assignment, the assignee assumes the same rights and obligations his assignor possessed at the time of assignment, unless there
is a contrary provision. Similarly, the assignor remains liable to the
lessor for breach of an express covenant unless there is a clause relieving him of liability for a good faith assignment.3 4
It appears the assignment of a mineral interest operates to put the
assignee in the shoes of the assignor. However, there is evidence to
The doctrine of divisibility of covenants prescribes
the contrary.
whether obligations are assignable.
A covenant is said to be indivisible where the compliance with the
covenant as to one segregated tract under a lease is also compliance
as to all tracts under the lease.
A covenant is said to be divisible where, in such situation, compliance or failure to comply affects only the particular segregated tract,
without effect upon the other tracts subject to the lease.
The habendum clause and modifying clauses are treated as indivisible in most jurisdictions .... The delay rental clause is normally
made divisible under the provisions of the modern lease. Opinion
6
differs whether implied covenants of the lessee are divisible.
The Shuttle Oil v. Hamon37 decision illustrates the difficulty in determining exactly which lease terms are automatically imputed to an
assignment.
It must be kept in mind [that this is] an assignment and not an
original lease. There is no provision in this assignment for a fixed
term or for a continuation of the assignment only for so long as
production continues. It expressly provides for termination only for
failure to drill the well. It is admitted that the assignment in question contains no express provision requiring the well to be completed for production or that continued production or operation is
necessary for perpetuation of the interest assigned.3 8
34. Sharon C. Dittfurth, Common Problems in Conveying Oil and Gas Interests,
MARY'S L.J. 825, 838-39 (1982).
35. There is some uncertainty whether Texas applies the traditional property law

13 ST.

distinction between an assignment and a sublease. Exception of an overriding royalty
could create a sublease since the assignor is retaining part of his interest. The federal
court adopted this theory in Moore v. Campbell, 267 F. Supp. 127, 131 (N.D. Tex.
1967). However, the only Texas case to do so was Hamblen v. Placid Oil Co., 279

S.W.2d 126, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Mecorn v. Hamblen, 289 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. 1956).
36. HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 9.10.
37. 477 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

38. Id. at 703.
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In Shuttle Oil, the assignment stipulated additional consideration
was necessary if the initial well produced. The assignment also provided it would terminate as to other tracts if the assignee subsequently
drilled on one of the other tracts and failed to produce or conduct
further drilling. Although the assignment did not expressly state the
duties of the assignee, the court interpreted the assignment as a whole
and concluded the assignee's ownership of one-quarter of the assignment only required drilling an initial well on that quarter, regardless
of whether the well was a producer or a dry hole."
r
Riley v. Meriwether"° examined the scope of an assignment. The
Riley court dealt with the termination of a corrected assignment. The
assignee was operating under an assignment that had been altered to
exclude a shut-in royalty provision. When Riley shut his wells in, he
did not pay shut-in royalties. Meriwether subsequently claimed the
assignment had terminated. The corrected assignment included a provision that "[r]eference for all purposes is made to the oil and gas
leases described in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein
by this reference."'" By referencing the other documents, Riley argued a shut-in clause which appeared in the base leases, but not in his
assignment, protected him. The court held Riley's assignment did not
incorporate expressly or by reference the shut-in royalty clause of the
lease. In support of its holding, the court stated "[w]hen courts interpret oil and gas leases, their main concern is to decide and give effect
to the party's [sic] intention."42
Clearly the partial assignment of a mineral lease conveys a portion
of the lessee's interest to the assignee. After Riley, how many of the
lease rights and obligations are incorporated in an assignment remains
a question.
B. Property Interests
1. Mineral leases may convey fees simple determinable
or profits d prendre in minerals.
Labeling the type of property interest an oil and gas lease or assignment conveys may appear to be a matter of semantics. Yet fortunes
may be lost for failure to understand such categorizations. As noted
earlier, under Texas law the oil and gas lease conveys a fee simple
determinable in the minerals in place. A fee simple determinable is a
defeasible fee - a present possessory estate in land that the occurrence of a specific event terminates.43 In a typical oil and gas lease,
39. Id. at 703-04.
40. 780 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
41. Id. at 924.
42. Id. (citing Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Management Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193,
196-97 (Tex. 1962)).
43. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.4, at 41 (2d ed.
1993).
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the defeasing event is the permanent cessation of oil or gas
production."
a. The fee simple determinable is an interest with specific, wellrecognized characteristics.
Under traditional property law, there is no remainder after a determinable fee. A possibility of reverter in the grantor follows a fee simple determinable. In other words, if production ceases, the mineral
estate automatically reverts to the lessor (surface owner).
To create a reversionary interest in a third party, the grant must
create an executory interest to follow the determinable fee.45 For example, a lessor could execute a lease conveying minerals to the lessee
for so long thereafter as minerals are produced and then to the First
Christian Church. When production of oil and gas ceases, the mineral
fee vests in the First Christian Church, rather than reverting to the
lessor. The church would hold an executory interest which 46would violate the rule against perpetuities if it vested too remotely.
b. In some states the oil and gas lease conveys an incorporeal
hereditament.
Texas, an ownership in place state, views mineral interests as present
possessory estates. Other states, which are termed exclusive right to
take states, consider the oil and gas lease as conveying a profit d prendre, which is an exclusive right to remove valuable substances from
the land. The primary distinction between profits and estates is that a
profit does not give the owner possessory rights, but instead grants
rights to use. In terms of an oil and gas lease, the owner of the profit
has the right to use the47 land to reduce the oil and gas below the surface to his personalty.

Profits may last for a determinate time or indefinitely. They are not
terminated at the will of the grantor, but by the terms of the agreement.48 In a typical oil and gas lease, profits last for as long as oil and

gas is produced.
Easements are distinguished from profits in that they allow use of
the land but do not create a right to remove valuable substances belonging to the grantor. 49 For example, when a party removes wild animals from the land, courts often consider the right an easement rather
than a profit.5" Courts have held in the same manner when water is
44. See LoWE supra note 8, at 192.
45. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 43, § 2.9 (citing 1 SIMES

AND SMITH, FUTURE INTER-

§ 228 (2d ed. 1956)).
46. See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
47. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 43, § 8.1 at 438.
48. Id. at 439.
49. Id. at 438.
50. Id. at 438-39.

ESTS
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removed. 5 1 These easements are created by expression, prior use, necessity, or prescription (a doctrine similar to adverse possession).
c. When the parties do not fulfill the terms of the lease,
jurisdictionaldifferences may determine what remedies
are available.
In most instances, construing a mineral lease as creating a fee simple determinable or a profit d prendre results in a distinction without a
difference. When the issue of abandonment arises however, the difference becomes meaningful. Estates in land cannot be abandoned,
though they can be acquired through adverse possession 52 and are
subject to trespass and the remedy of eviction. Conversely, profits can
be abandoned and are not subject to trespass.5 3
Texas courts have held an estate in land cannot be abandoned.5 4 In
Waggoner v. Sigler Oil Co.,55 the court stated,
Under the doctrine that the lessee acquires no absolute, but only
a determinable, fee there can be no complete cessation of the use of
the leased land for purposes of mineral exploration, development,
and production, save at the cost of loss of the lessee's estate. It is
easy to confuse this principle with that of abandonment, which .implies an intention to give up the interests granted. There should be
no confusion. Regardless of the lessee's intention, his estate terminates, under its limitation, when there is complete cessation of actual use of the land for the purposes of the lease. There can be no
fraudulent evasion with respect to the use which keeps the estate
alive. But it is not partial use, nor a negligent use, nor an imperfect
use, but cessation of use, which terminates the lessee's estate.
The soundness is sometimes questioned of the rule in Texas and
elsewhere that interests declared to be fees in land may be lost by
abandonment. Mr. Summers points out, however, that in all jurisdictions where the view prevails that an oil or gas lease creates a
vested interest in the lessee, for the purposes of the lease, as soon as
it is made, the courts "have not hesitated to declare such lease terminated on that account .... The general rule, therefore, seems to
be that an oil and gas lease, regardless of what theory the court may
take as to the nature of the interest created thereby is extinguishable by abandonment." Ample foundation for the doctrine is to be
found in the very nature and object of these mineral development
conveyances and contracts.5 6
51. Id. at 439.

52. See id. § 11.7.
53. Id. § 8.12.
54. See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi v. McCarver, 275 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio), rev'd on other grounds, 284 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1955); Pugh v.
Clark, 238 S.W.2d 980, 984 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951; writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. 19 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1929).
56. Id. at 32 (citing WALTER L. SUMMERS, LAW OF OIL AND GAS 519-20 (1927)).
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Courts recognize another distinction between right to take and ownership in place states. In exclusive right to take states, ownership vests
when the oil or gas is reduced to possession.57 In ownership in place
states, the law is less clear.
In ownership in place states, the party holding the interest while the
minerals are still in the ground owns the minerals. Since oil is subject
to drainage and the rule of capture, courts have often regarded ownership as meaningful only when the minerals are reduced to possession.
Case
law illustrates the confusion. Stephens v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas
Co.5 8 discussed two opinions written by the same judge. In Bender v.
Brooks,5 9 the judge stated that one did not have title to oil "until it
had been removed from the earth."6 But in Right of Way Oil Co. v.
Gladys City Oil, Gas & Manufacturing Co.,6 1 the same judge did not
deny that oil in place was capable of ownership. 6 The Stephens court
concluded oil and gas is owned in place, but one may appropriate it
from an adjacent tract without liability.63
d. An assignment, whether partialor total, creates
a mineral interest that is difficult to define.
Generally, case law treats the assignment as a defeasible fee. Case
law does not fully address what property interest a partial assignment
creates. Courts have tried to avoid construing interests as executory
since that subjects the interest to the rule against perpetuities.64 Such
avoidance, one hopes, is in deference to the intent of the parties,
rather than the complexity of applying the rule.
In Williams v. Watt,65 a Wyoming case, the court found the mineral
lease created a defeasible estate. In particular, the court held the interest in a third party, which vested upon the occurrence of the defeasing condition, was a remainder rather 'than an executory interest
because of the unique attributes of the mineral estate.6 6 The court
rewrote Wyoming property law, merging executory interests with
other remainders in a broad category of future interests thereby
avoiding the rule against perpetuities.67
57. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 6.1 at 258-61.
58. 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923).
59. 127 S.W. 168 (Tex. 1910).
60. Id. at 170.
61. 157 S.W. 737 (Tex. 1913).
62. Stephens, 254 S.W. at 291.
63. Id. at 292.
64. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 43, § 2.9.
65. 668 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1983). Wyoming is an ownership in place state. Id. at 624.
66. Id. at 627-28 (citing Arrington v. United Royalty Co., 65 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ark.
1953); see, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 23, 44 (1936); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 4, intro, note (1936)).
67. The court avoided the rule by classifying the interest of the grantee following
the termination of the term interest as a vested remainder. The result is salutory, but
the rationale is insupportable.
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141

In contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained,
The rule against perpetuities is not a rule of construction, but a preemptory command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a
test, more or less artificial, to determine intention. Its object is to
defeat intention. Therefore every provision in a will or settlement is
to be construed as if the rule did not exist, and then to the provision
so construed the rule is to be remorselessly applied. We must be
careful not to strain the law so as to avoid this rule. It is founded
upon a sound principle of public policy and should be rigidly
enforced.
The court described the policy underlying the rule as follows:
Such an impress on land [one that violates the rule] ought not to be
sustained, and it cannot be. It isolates the property. It takes it out of
commerce. It removed [sic] it from the market. It halts improvements. It prevents the land from answering to the needs of growing
communities. No homes can be built or towns laid out on land so
encumbered, because the land always remains subject to be taken
under the option. It is not a matter which affects the rights of individuals only. The entire community is interested. The welfare of
the public is at stake. It is contrary to the well settled public policy
of the state that such an option or right to purchase land should be
held to be good. It was for the express purpose of destroying such
serious hindrances to material and social prosperityand progress
that the rule against perpetuities was brought forth. And the rule

must be rigidly enforced. 68

Wyoming has a constitutional clause and a statute which prohibit
perpetuities.69 The Wyoming court therefore refused to carve out an
exception for fear of violating the constitutional and statutory provisions. Justice Thomas, the sole dissenter in an earlier hearing of this
case, appropriately recognized in his concurrence that courts should
uphold the intent of the parties, when clear. However, he also recognized the reason for the rule - to promote free alienability of land.
A similar case was that of Earle v. International Paper Co., 429 So. 2d 989
(Ala. 1983) which also held a reserved term mineral interest did not violate
the rule against perpetutities, using a strained application of common law
rules as to future interests, in that the grantor owned a fee simple determinable and the grantee a reversion. Rather than twist the common law rules
relating to future interests, a better approach would be to treat such interests
as sui generis and fashion a rule of construction related to the realities of
such transactions.
HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 2.9 n.259.
68. Central Del. County Auth. v. Greyhound Corp., 588 A.2d 485, 490-91 (Pa.
1991) (quoting Barton v. Thaw, 92 A. 312, 314-16 (Pa. 1914)) (citations omitted) (economic development and prosperity depends on free alienability of land. It is for this
reason that the rule against perpetuities is a "preemptory command of law.., is to be
remorselessly applied."). Id.
69. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 30; Wyo. STAT. § 34-1-139 (1994).
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Like Wyoming, Texas has a constitutional clause and a statute which
act to avoid perpetuities.70 In Forderhausev. Cherokee Water Co.,71 a
Texas court refused to apply the rule against perpetuities to a deed
provision for the preferential right to purchase minerals.72 In
Forderhause,the surface estate was conveyed to Cherokee. The grantor reserved the minerals, but gave Cherokee a preferential right to
purchase them in the event of sale to a third party. Cherokee then
contested the grantor's mineral lease to a third party. 73 After determining that the mineral lease was equivalent to the conveyance of
minerals, the Texas Supreme Court, without further comment,
adopted the reasoning of the appellate court, holding commercial conveyances were not subject to the rule.74
Conversely, Texas courts have applied the rule against perpetuities
to a royalty deed that conveyed a royalty interest in oil and gas which
was to be effective upon defeasance of a fee to another party. In
Peveto v. Starkey, the court found this deed created a springing executory interest that violated the rule against perpetuities.75
Where there is a partial assignment, the characterization of the interest created determines its facial validity, who will come into possession upon its termination, and what happens if the terms of the
assignment fail. Courts may choose to call the interest a fee simple
determinable, an executory interest, a remainder, or merely a defeasible interest. The importance of the label used must not be
understated.
C. Certainty of Title
Certainty of title is a major policy consideration in oil and gas law.
The basic question in all trespass to try title actions is who owns what
and why. In a trespass to try title suit, the party who proves superior
title prevails.76
Deeds convey legal title from grantor to grantee. General warranty
deeds 77 purport to convey the interest free and clear of all encum70. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEX. PROP. CODE ArN. § 5.043 (Vernon 1994).

71. 623 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana), rev'd on other grounds, 641
S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1981).

72. Id. at 438-39.
73. Id. at 437-38.
74. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d at 526.
75. Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982).

76. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 883 S.W.2d 763, 768 (Tex. 1994).
77. General warranty deeds are defined as follows,
A deed in which grantor warrants good, clear title. A deed which explicitly
contains covenants concerning the quality of title it conveys. In some states,
statutes impute warranties or covenants from the use of specific words, such
as grant. The usual covenants of title are warranties of seisin, quiet enjoyment, right to convey, freedom from encumbrances, and defense of title as to
all claims.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1589 (6th ed. 1990).
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brances except those mentioned in the document. A warranty deed
may be distinguished from a quitclaim deed,78 which only conveys
whatever title the grantor has or may have, and thus does not give rise
to damages if the title is defective. The quitclaim deed protects the
grantor from damages where the grantor is uncertain about what he
owns.
Title to minerals may be acquired through means other than conveyance. Like a surface estate, a possessor may acquire a mineral estate by adverse possession. Texas, like most states, has statutes of
limitation allowing adverse possession.79 Under the Texas statutes
governing limitations on real property actions,
(1) "Adverse possession" means an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of
right that is inconsistent and is hostile to the claim of another
person.
(2) "Color of title" means a consecutive chain of transfers to the
person in possession that:
(A) is not regular because of a muniment that is not properly
recorded or is only in writing or because of a similar defect that
does not want of intrinsic fairness or honesty; or
(B) is based on a certificate of headright, land warrant, or land
scrip.
(3) "Peaceable possession" means possession of real property
that is continuous and is not interrupted by an adverse suit to recover the property.
(4) "Title" means a regular chain of transfers of real property
from or under the sovereignty of the soil. 80
Generally, an adverse possessor must make entry with a claim of
right to claim the land as his own. He must occupy the land openly
and visibly. The adverse claimant must exclusively and continuously
possess the property for the limitations period to acquire title. In order to ascertain whether title by adverse possession has been obtained, a well-accepted test for determining whether a claim is hostile
is whether the adverse possessor's use, occupancy, and possession of
78. A quitclaim deed is defined as,
A deed of conveyance operating by way of release; that is intended to pass
any title, interest, or claim which the grantor may have in the premises, but
not professing that such title is valid, nor containing any warranty or covenants for title. In a number of states, a deed which purports to transfer nothing more than interest which grantor may have, if any, at time of transaction,
and excludes any implication that he has any title or interest in described
realty.
Id. at 1251 (citing Sabine Prod. Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 482 So. 2d 1047,
1052 (La. Ct. App. 1983)).
79. Texas, in fact, has three-year, five-year, ten-year, and twenty-five year limitation periods, all with different statutory requirements. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
AN. §§ 16.024-.027 (Vernon 1986).
80. TEX. Civ. PRic. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.021 (Vernon 1994).
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the land is of such nature and character as to reasonably notify the
true owner that a hostile claim is being asserted. 8 '
Although in an ownership in place state the mineral estate cannot
be abandoned, minerals, nevertheless, are subject to adverse
possession.
Following a severance of the mineral estate, adverse possession
thereof may be acquired by continuous operations and production
of oil and gas for the statutory period.
Where such production occurs in relation to an oil and gas lease
or other written instrument, the better view is that title, when matured, will relate to all the minerals and to the territorial extent evidenced in such instrument. Constructive possession will not affect
tracts in a chain of title other than that upon which production
occurs.
Where such production occurs not in relation to a written instrument, the nature and extent of title matured depends on the claim
evidenced by the possessor. As to the minerals so affected, such
claim should presumptively
be the same as that manifested under an
82
oil and gas lease.
An adverse possessor's intent to claim land ownership is an essential element of adverse possession.83 The adverse possessor's intent is
evaluated by the possessor's actions and creates a question of fact for
the jury.' Possession by mistake has been held to run against the
85
limitations period when possession is adverse. In Arnold v. Evans,
the adverse claimant took possession of a neighbor's strip of land
under the mistaken belief that it was his. The court upheld his acquisition of title because he possessed the property for the statutory period
although he lacked the requisite intent.86
The question of notice arises whenever a party invokes a statute of
limitations defense. Courts have declined to uphold an adverse possession claim where a co-tenant never gave notice of an adverse claim
or engaged in such acts sufficient to constitute notice.87 In O.K.C.
Corp. v. Allen,88 the court held a church's occupation of land, includ81. Elliott v. Elliott, 597 S.W.2d 795, 800-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

82.

HEMINGWAY,

supra note 8, § 3.5.

83. Champion Paper & Fire Co. v. Wooding, 321 S.W.2d 127, 135 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis v. Breithaupt, 400 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. Bruni v. Viduarri, 166 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex. 1942) (holding that possessor's
statements prior to suit expressing amicable purpose could be admitted against the
possessor and when admitted are at least sufficient to raise an issue of fact).
85. 140 S.W. 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ dism'd w.o.j.). See also Logan v.
Meade, 98 S.W. 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
86. 140 S.W. at 498.
87. Browning v. West, 557 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
88. 574 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ing openly and visibly building a church on the land, gave actual and
constructive notice to the owner.89
As previously discussed, title can vest by reversion. Actual conveyance is unnecessary to revest title.90 In Texas, owners of mineral interests have an implied duty to reconvey interests that have reverted or
which they have abandoned. Of course, an action for failure to reconvey is an action for specific performance that acts to quiet title, but
does nothing to actually affect the interests involved.9 '
A curative affidavit 92 often is sufficient to make an otherwise unmarketable title satisfactory to a purchaser. A curative affidavit's
"usefulness depends on the detail, reliability, and factual accuracy of
the information and the affiant's personal knowledge of the facts."9 3
All states recognize that the law should not unreasonably burden
transfers of land, but rather should permit quieting of titles, encourage
development of mineral resources, and eliminate dormant mineral interests. This is evidenced by the fact all states have some forms of
curative statutes as well as common law doctrines grounded in these
policies. 94
In Texas, the Davis doctrine once provided a common law solution
to clouds on title resulting from abandonment of purpose of a mineral
conveyance. Courts could use the Davis doctrine in situations where
the parties could not obtain general warranty title and marketable title. An affidavit accurately reflecting the operator's abandonment of
purpose could serve to provide a title well worth the business risk. 95
Proving title depends on being able to answer a number of questions. "[A]ffidavits can only be used where legal standards are certain
and readily definable." 96 The law provides clear methods for resolution in some areas and no sure ways to decide in others.9 7
89. Id. at 812.
90. See Hart v. Meadows, 302 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957,

writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. Id.

92. Voluntary curative action consists of preparing, executing, and recording
instruments that address various title problems raised in the title opinion. If
the necessary parties are alive, can be located, and are cooperative, curative
conveyances such as assignments, releases, quitclaim deeds, and correction
deeds usually represent the surest and least expensive method of curing
many title problems.... Various affidavit forms are frequently used to cure
title irregularities.
Joseph Shade, Petroleum Land Titles: Title Examination & Title Opinions, 46 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1008, 1058-59 (1994).

93. Joseph Shade, Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondents' Petition for
Rehearing at Part II, Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. "Though the adverse possessor gains legal title, it is not likely to be 'marketable' title for a purchaser. This is because, first, the title is subject to litigation and,
second, conveyancers generally have the notion that title must be marketable of record." CUNNINGHAM supra note 43, § 11.7 n.1 (citation omitted).
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In a trespass to try title suit, the oil and gas attorney must consider
several issues. What rights does the mineral lease convey from the
lessor to the lessee? In Texas, it conveys a fee simple determinable.98
How much does the mineral lease assignment convey from the assignor to the assignee? The law is uncertain. It places the assignee in
the shoes of the assignor, but it does not incorporate the terms of the
base lease merely by reference. 9 Have any of the lease interests
failed, and if not, under what conditions will the mineral lease fail?
The mineral lease certainly terminates by failure to produce or pay
delay rentals in the primary term' ° or to produce in paying quantities
in the secondary term. Other ways a lease may terminate are uncertain. The mineral lease could fail for breach of express or implied
covenants under extraordinary circumstances where a conditional decree has been executed.' 0 '
Since express terms are subject to judicial interpretation, it is difficult to predict whether a court will view a term as a condition or a
covenant for purposes of determining whether a party has failed to
fulfill its obligations. If a conveyance is unambiguous, 0 2 courts
should only consider the four corners of the document. 10 3 However, if
the conveyance is ambiguous, courts can apply the construction of
their choice.' 4 Likewise, implied covenants are creatures of public
98.

LOWE,

supra note 8, at 30.

99. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
100. LowE, supra note 8, at 191-96.
101. Today, the lease may also fail by appointment of a receiver for absent mineral
owners. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 64.091-.092 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1995).
102. [Tlhe court must apply a standard of reasonableness in interpreting contract language....
The overarching principle is that the court is free to look to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction including all writings, oral
statements, and other conduct by which the parties manifested their assent,
together with any prior negotiations, applicable course of performance or
usage.

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS § 7.10 (1990) (footnotes omitted).

103. Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982).
104. Mineral conveyances have presented some of the most challenging documents
for interpretation by the courts. Many of these conveyances were drafted informally
between friends and were considered a mere formality (and a nuisance) commemorating a bargain struck between the parties. Subsequent transfers by the parties often
left claimants bound by a document to which they were not the original parties, and
the intent of the original parties was hard to discern. Over the years, the courts in
desperation developed canons of construction in an attempt to divine the meaning of
the document and the intent of the parties. Common canons include ejusdem generis,
the greatest estate rule, and the repugnant to the grant principle. See Bruce M.
Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of InterpretingMineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1993).
Professor Bruce Kramer's exhaustive article on interpretation of mineral deeds and
leases concluded,
[tihe continued adherence to outdated forms as well as the continued confusion as to the nature of the interests owned by the parties after an oil and gas
lease has been executed have created difficult interpretational issues. These
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policy and may be construed, according to the needs of the industry, 10at5
the time of interpretation rather than at the time of the conveyance.
lease may fail under the Davis abandonment of purpose
Finally, the
06
doctrine.'
Under what conditions will the mineral assignment fail? This is an
area of great uncertainty. It depends on how much of the lease the
assignment incorporates. If the assignment incorporates all of the
lease, it will terminate under the same conditions as the lease. 10 7 It
may terminate by failure of the condition, by abandonment of purpose, or by breach of implied or express covenants to the extent there
is no adequate remedy at law.' 08 If the assignment incorporates only
the lease provisions specified in the assignment, it will terminate only
according to its own express terms. Ultimately, the mineral assignment terminates according to the way in which the court decides to
interpret it.
Finally, in the event that the lease or assignment fails, to whom will
the interest pass? The lease reverts to the lessor unless there has been
an interest reserved in a third party.' 9 If an interest has been reserved, and the court determines the interest is executory, the validity
of the interest will depend on whether the court decides to apply the
rule against perpetuities.
Rogers v. Ricane is a trespass to try title action. The Rogers group
is successor in interest to Western Company, the holder of a partial
assignment of a mineral lease. Ricane Enterprises drilled a producing
well on what was once the Western partial assignment. Ricane drilled
the well more than twenty years after Western abandoned operations
and went out of business. Rogers claimed title through the Western
assignment. Ricane claimed title through an assignment from Superior Oil. The validity of the assignment from Superior to Ricane depended on the failure of Western's interest.

difficulties have led to a jurisprudence with little predictability and doctrinal
upheaval.
Id. at 129.
105. "Implicit in most decisions on implied covenants is the premise that they are
implied in fact to 'fill in' the agreement of the parties. However, that assumption may
be embraced without good reason or because it yields a pleasing result." LoWE, supra
note 8, at 306.
106. Texas Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1923).
107. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 9.11, at 556.
108. Id. § 8.11 at 490-92; see supra note 35 and acompanying text.
109. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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RoGERs v. RiCANE ENTERPRISES, INC.

A.

The Facts of the Case

The facts of Rogers v. Ricane unfolded over several decades."' In
1937, Carrie Dean entered into an oil and gas lease with P.N. Wiggins.
The lease covered 7,893 acres, including 329.3 acres that are the subject of the suit. The lease was to extend in the secondary term for so
long thereafter as oil or gas was produced, and expressly provided for
total or partial assignment. The lease also provided if the premises
"hereafter [were] owned in severalty or in separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless [would] be developed.., as one lease."'' The lease
was assigned to Superior Oil Co. during a period of production.
On June 1, 1949, Superior assigned the portion of the lease covering
329.3 acres to Western Drilling Company. The Superior to Western
assignment stated,
This assignment is made subject to the following condition and
provision:
1.
All of the right, title, interest and privileges herein conveyed to
and conferred upon Western will cease and terminate and shall revert to and revest in Superior, unless within thirty (30) days after
the datehereof [sic], Western shall commence drilling of a well for
oil and gas upon the above described land.
2.
Western shall and hereby does assume and agree to perform and
discharge all of the [Dean] lease obligations, express or implied ....
To this end, it is recognized by the parties hereto ... that there now
are a number of... off-set wells which Western shall protect against
by the drilling of properly located wells on the above described
land, in due and proper time, and subject to all of the applicable
provisions of this Agreement.
5.
In the event that the production of oil, gas or other hydrocarbon
substances is developed on the above described leased premises by
Western, and Western desires to abandon or cease operating the
same, Western shall notify Superior in writing of such desire, and
Superior may, at its election, require Western to transfer and assign
to Superior or to its nominee all of Western's right, title and interest
inand [sic] to said lease, together with the well or wells located
thereon and together with such equipment used in connection
therewith which Superior may desire to acquire.
110. These facts are gathered from the four reported appellate and Texas Supreme
Court decisions. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 775 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1987), rev'd and remanded, 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989); 852 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1993) (on remand), rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
111. 852 S.W.2d at 754.
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Upon the termination of the rights of Western hereunder and/or
with respect to the above described lease, as herein and in said lease
expressly provided, or otherwise, Western shall deliver to Superior
upon demand, a good and sufficient quit-claim deed and release.
Any delay, failure or refusal on thepart [sic] of Western to deliver
any such quit-claim and release shall in no way prevent such rights
from terminating, and reverting to and revesting in Superior as
herein expressly provided and contemplated.'1
Western drilled and completed a single marginally productive well.
The well ceased production in July of 1961 and was converted to salt
water disposal.
On August 23, 1960, E.P. Campbell, president of Western, executed
a conveyance in his personal capacity giving his right, title, and interest in the 329.3 acres by quitclaim deed to the Dakota Company, Inc.
By later assignment, Torreyana Oil Company obtained the interest
and drilled a producing well that was acquired by Ricane."1 3 E.P.
Campbell died on May 5, 1961. On July 5, 1965, the Texas Secretary
of State forfeited Western's corporate charter." 4 The shareholders
appointed Keith Cecil, Jr. as the person responsible for winding up the
affairs of Western. According to his testimony, Mr. Cecil's intent was
to pay the Internal Revenue Service and "get the hell out of
Dodge.""' 5
B.

The Courts' First Look at Rogers v. Ricane

The trial court issued summary judgment for Ricane Enterprises
and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed
the summary
judgment and remanded the case for trial on the
1 6
merits.

In 1984, the Rogers group brought a trespass to try title and conversion 1 7 action against Ricane, claiming the Superior to Western assignment was valid and in full force and effect. The trial court rendered a
take nothing summary judgment for the defendants."" The court of
appeals affirmed, and held the determinable fee acquired by assignment terminated when production ceased from Western's only well.
112. Id. at 754-55.
113.. Id at 755. •
114. Id. at 751.
115. Id. at 762.
116. Ricane, 772 S.W.2d 76.
117. The conversion action has not yet been heard. Until the latest supreme court
reversal, there had been no need to hear the conversion action because on both occasions the trial courts held and the appellate courts affirmed that Ricane Enterprises
owned the minerals at issue. Ricane, 884 S.W.2d at 770.
118. Ricane, 774 S.W.2d at 392.
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The judgment was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court.119 The
Texas Supreme Court held in its first examination of Ricane that
neither abandonment nor laches was a valid defense to the action, and
the assignee's rights had not automatically terminated. 2 0
To reach this decision, the court determined the language used in an
oil and gas lease should not impose a special limitation on the grant
unless the language is so clear, precise, and unequivocal it could not
reasonably be given any other meaning.' 2 ' The court also found the
requirement that the assignee perform the obligations of the base
lease was a covenant, not a condition, and thus could not work to
terminate the rights of the assignee. 122 The court found the terms of
paragraph two were a condition, citing the distinction between conditions and covenants articulated in Freeman and Shuttle Oil.123 The
court concluded the language in paragraph one indicated the parties
knew how to create a condition. Therefore, it reasoned the parties'
use of "agreed to perform"
in paragraph two indicated their intent to
1 24
create a covenant.

The Texas Supreme Court cited City of Corpus Christi v. McCarver125 and Pugh v. Clark126 for the proposition that title to real
property interests may not be abandoned in Texas. The court established that summary judgment
for Ricane could not be sustained on
7
an abandonment theory.1
On the points of error regarding laches and limitations, the Texas
Supreme Court held that "[1]aches is not a defense in a trespass to try
title suit where the plaintiff's right is based on legal title.' 121 8 Regarding limitations, the court stated the party asserting adverse possession
has the burden of proof to show the requisite claim under title and
color of title. Despite the assertion that the deposition of Harry Allred of Torreyana Oil proves peaceable and adverse possession since
1979, that deposition was not part of the record on appeal. 29 The
court concluded sufficient evidence did not appear in the record to
sustain a summary judgment on the limitations issue. The Supreme
Court of Texas reversed the appellate court's affirmation of summary
119. Ricane, 772 S.W.2d 76.
120. Id. at 78-81.
121. Id. at 79 (citing Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. 1966)).
122. Id. (citing Fox, 398 S.W.2d at 92).
123. Id. at 79 (citing Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 171 S.W.2d 339, 342
(Tex. 1943); Shuttle Oil Corp. v. Hamon, 477 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
124. Id.
125. 275 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), rev'd on other grounds,
284 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1955).
126. 238 S.W.2d 980, 984 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989).
128. Id. (citing Cagle v. Sabine Valley Timber & Lumber Co., 202 S.W. 942, 943
(Tex. 1918)).

129. Id. at 80-81.
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judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the
merits. 30
C. Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., The Second Time Around
1. The trial court ruled in favor of Ricane Enterprises.
The second hearing of Rogers v. Ricane'3 was a jury hearing. The
jury found inter alia that Western was the common source of title to
all parties.' 32 Western ceased operating the leased premises, and
abandoned the purposes of the 1949 assignment from Superior Oil.
Many of the points of error on appeal revolved around these findings
of the jury.' Appellants argued Texas law did not recognize abandonment of an oil and gas lease, making the question regarding abandonment of the lease irrelevant. The question regarding
abandonment of purpose was argued to be inadmissible as law of the
case, since appellants contended the supreme court reversed the earlier summary judgment based on the denial of the abandonment
theory.
2. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The appellate court began its analysis by setting forth the rules.
First, the plaintiff ina trespass to try title suit must recover on the
strength of his own title." In this case, Rogers had to prove that
Western had good title when it lost its charter. Second, the instruments in question would be construed to ascertain and "give effect to
the intent of the parties as gathered from the entire instrument, together with surrounding circumstances, unless that intention is in conflict with some unbending
canon of construction or is repugnant to the
35
terms of the grant.'
The appellate court reasoned the purpose of the Superior assignment was to attain exploration, development, and production of minerals from the assigned acreage. Furthermore, it held the assignment
to Western required not only the drilling of an initial well, but also
diligent development to protect against drainage and good faith drilling operations
upon cessation of production as specified in the Dean
36
lease.'
130.
131.
1994).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 81.
852 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993), rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

759.
755-56.
756.
757.
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The court distinguished the rule of Texas Co. v. Davis'37 from the

holdings of Waggoner v. Sigler Oil CO. 138 and Mon-Tex Corp. v.
Poteet,139 stating that a party seeking termination for breach of covenant must carry a heavy burden. 4 ' In Davis, the operator had no
then-existing producing well and had removed all equipment from the
premises. The court found the operator had abandoned the purpose
of the lease, and thus the operator's mineral interest had terminated.' 4 ' In both Waggoner and Poteet, the operators had abandoned
further development, but still had wells that were producing. 142 In
both cases the court held there was a breach of an implied covenant
redressable by an action for damages, but only in the most extraordithe court support an action for termination
nary circumstances would
43
of mineral interests.'
In the first Ricane decision, the Texas Supreme Court determined
that paragraph two of the assignment was a covenant without considering it in light of paragraph seven. Paragraph seven of the assignment provided for the transfer of title back to Superior in the event of
termination of rights under the lease. Under the extraordinary circumstances alluded to in Waggoner, grantor could seek a cancellation
decree to compel reasonable production or termination. 44 Such a decree is supported when no other remedy at law is available, and can be
maintained on a showing that the operator did not intend to develop
the leased lands as contemplated by the terms of the agreement. 145
The court acknowledged these Texas cases depict a very limited
right to terminate for breach of a covenant to develop. The party
seeking the termination must show (1) the grantee abandoned or
ceased to use the premises for the purposes of the mineral lease; (2)
damages do not provide an adequate remedy at law; and (3) a condito adhere to the terms would not protional decree requiring grantee
146
vide an adequate remedy.
The Rogers group claimed Ricane was estopped from asserting
Western no longer had good title. They based this claim on the fact
that Ricane had mentioned Western's possible interest in a division
order and in a title opinion which mentioned a possible gap in title
from Western. When the witness testified this did not support a valid
137. 254 S.W. 304 (Tex. 1923).
138. 19 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1929).
139. 19 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1929).
140. Ricane, 852 S.W.2d at 757-59.
141. Davis, 254 S.W. at 309.
142. Waggoner, 19 S.W.2d at 28; Poteet, 19 S.W.2d at 33.
143. Ricane, 852 S.W.2d at 758-59.
144. Waggoner, 19 S.W.2d at 29 (citing Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 6
S.W.2d 1031, 1035 (Tex. 1928)).
145. Ricane, 852 S.W.2d at 758 (citing Rendlemen v. Bartlett, 21 S.W.2d 58, 59
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929, writ ref'd)).
146. Id. at 759.
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title, the court of appeals found no record of sufficient acknowledgment of Western's title by Superior.147
The court rejected appellant's argument that the abandonment issue was a question of mixed law and fact and thus not a question for
the jury. The appellate court concluded this was a question of fact
alone since the term abandonment is a word of common import and
understanding and does not require technical explanation. Further,
the court found it was unnecessary for the jury to determine Western's
subjective intent since there was adequate evidence Western had
ceased production, had failed to drill any additional wells, and had
forfeited its corporate charter. According to the appellate court, this
evidence was sufficient to support the jury findings as to abandonment
and abandonment of purpose, thereby terminating title that the jury
acknowledged Western once owned. 148 Dismissing other procedural
points of error, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that
Western failed to sustain its burden of proving valid title and therefore
title vested in the appellees. 149
3. In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed
the appellate court.
The Supreme Court of Texas heard the second Ricane appeal on
January 18, 1994 - a decade after the initial cause was filed, fifteen
years after Ricane began production on the tract, and more than thirty
years after Western walked away from the lone well it drilled on the
329.3 acres. 50 Appellants argued the supreme court's ruling in the
first Ricane decision that the lease had not terminated implicitly overruled the Davis abandonment of purpose doctrine.'
Ricane responded that the assignment automatically terminated both under the
terms of the assignment and pursuant to the Davis doctrine. 5 2
Affirming its first Ricane decision, the court determined the assignment did not terminate under its own provision because paragraph3
two of the assignment created a covenant rather than a condition.'
The court then examined Ricane's contention that the lease terminated by the terms of paragraphs five and seven. These paragraphs
called for contractual termination upon failure of Western to transfer
54
title in the event its rights terminated for failure of the condition.
Since the court found Western satisfied the only condition that could
work a termination by drilling the initial well, paragraphs five and
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 760-61.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 762-63.
Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
Id. at 765.
Id.
Id. at 767-68.
1& at 766.
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seven were of no consequence. 15 5 Further, the court cited Colby v.
Sun Oil for the proposition that although case law construes mineral
leases more strongly against the lessee and in favor of the lessor, that
construction does not apply to forfeiture provisions.156
Next, the court analyzed whether the Davis doctrine applied to the
Western assignment. The court recited the pertinent facts in Davis:
The lease contained no stated term for its existence, but provided
that the conveyance was made for "the purpose of drilling, mining
and operating for minerals," and that in the event oil or other minerals were discovered, the conveyance would be "in full force and
effect for twenty-five years from the time of the discovery of such
product, and as much longer as oil, water, gas or other minerals can
be produced in paying quantities." Drilling began within two years,
but all production on the property ceased and all drilling equipment
and machinery were subsequently removed from the premises during the twenty-five year period referenced in the lease. This caused
Davis, the lessor's assignee, to sue Texas Company, the lessee's assignee, for recovery of the lease on basis that the condition of drilling had not been satisfied.' 57
The Davis court concluded: 1) the lease in question conveyed a determinable fee, and 2) the purpose of the lease was the production of
oil and gas. 158 The court noted that once the drilling condition was
met, title to the minerals vested only for the purpose specified - exploration, development, and production of minerals. When the lessee
ceased using the land for the stated purpose, the estate instantly
terminated. 159
In Ricane, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded:
Davis stands, therefore, for the proposition of law that, if the expressed purpose of the lease is the production of minerals and the

grantee "entirely and permanently stopped and abandoned the exploration and development" of the property in question,1 60then the
estate terminates at once and title reverts to the grantor.
The court, maintaining it had not implicitly overruled Davis, stated
the lease in Davis contained terms limiting its duration to as much
longer as oil or gas was produced, whereas the assignment to Western
contained no such expression.' 6 ' Based on this distinction, the court
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Colby v. Sun Oil, 288 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston

1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
157. Id. (quoting Texas Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W. 304, 305-06 (Tex. 1923)) (alteration
in original) (citations omitted).
158. Davis, 254 S.W. at 306.
159. Id.
160. Ricane, 884 S.W.2d at 766 (quoting Davis, 254 S.W. at 309).
161. Ricane, 884 S.W.2d at 767.
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determined the questions submitted to the jury regarding abandonment of purpose were irrelevant and Davis did not apply. 62
In response to Ricane's assertion that the assignment adopted the
obligations in the base lease, and the base lease contained determinable fee language, the court turned to the base lease provision that
stated the lease would be treated as one unit in the event of tracts
being separated. The court asserted that under this provision production anywhere on the lease would save the assignment from termination. The court relied
on Shuttle Oil v. Hamon and Dacamara v.
1 63
Binney for support.
The court ruled even if there was an implied covenant to drill in the
assignment, the appropriate remedy for breach would be contract
damages or a conditional decree, not termination. Furthermore, the
court said the appropriate party to bring that action would
be Supe164
rior, Western's assignor, who was not a party in this case.
The court disposed of the Davis doctrine and Ricane's theory that
the lease automatically terminated because of a defeasing condition in
the assignment. 6 The court then decided that the circumstances
were not extraordinary enough to prevent adequate recovery for a
breach of the implied covenants. 66 The court next examined the relative strength of the parties' titles. 167 Both parties claimed title through
Western. The Rogers group claimed as shareholders of the now defunct company. Ricane claimed title through a chain that included the
quitclaim deed issued by E.P. Campbell."
To demonstrate superior title from a common source, plaintiff
needed only to prove good title coming from that source to meet its
burden. 6 9 In this case, Rogers needed to show that at the time Western forfeited its corporate charter it held good title to the minerals.
Because the forfeiture caused Western to cease existence as a legal
entity, the shareholders' interest in the assets of the company made
them successors in interest. The State could have put a lien on the
property at the time of the forfeiture, but there was no indication it
170
did.
To show abandonment of purpose and lack of interest from Western's shareholders, Ricane relied heavily on Western's insolvency and
its attempts to merely satisfy its debts when dissolving the corpora162. Id
163. Id. (citing Shuttle Oil v. Hamon, 477 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dacamara v. Binney, 146 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.)).
164. Id. at 768.
165. IM at 767-68.
166. Id. at 767.
167. Id at 768.
168. Id at 769.
169. Id at 768.
170. Id.
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tion. 17 1 The court held, however, that absent a showing of transfer of
title, it would
not consider Western's financial problems as a factor to
72
defeat title.1
The court stated Campbell's heirs could not be estopped from
claiming interests acquired through inheritance of Campbell's
stock. 173 The court noted the quitclaim deed only purported to convey what Campbell personally held at the time and the 1960 quitclaim
deed did not preclude any interest based on Western stock. 1 74 It was
critically important that Campbell issued the 1960 quitclaim deed in
his personal capacity and not as a Western representative. The quitclaim deed did not purport to convey any interest of
Western's and
75
could not by itself be construed as transfer of title.'
Finally, Ricane claimed title through recognition of its rights by Superior issuing division orders and by Superior's demand for reassignment by Western.' 76 The court found no title was transferred merely
by a division order contract. 77 Although Superior had the right to
demand reassignment from Western, Superior's failure to pursue an
action against Western in court preserved Western's rights. 178 Thus,
the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and quieted
title in the Rogers group. 79
4. Four justices joined in dissent.
Justice Hightower dissented, joined by Justices Doggett, Gammage
and Spector.18 0 They noted particularly that Davis stated:
Our object is to announce a rule which is truly consonant with the
real intent of the contracting parties.
We are convinced: First that Underwood and his assigns took
only a determinable fee .... and, second, that abandonment of the
purpose for which Underwood and his assigns were invested with
8
their title was necessarily fatal to the maintenance of the Suit 1 1
The dissent claimed the majority erroneously required the conveyance
to state its purpose instead of trying to find the intent of the parties.''
Justice Hightower contended the majority ignored the time honored
rule of construing a contract as a whole in light of the purposes for
171. Id. at 769.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 769 n.5.
174. Id. at 769.
175. Id. at 769-70.
176. Id. at 770.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (Hightower, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Hightower, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W. 304, 309
(Tex. 1923)).
182. Id. at 770 (Hightower, J., dissenting).
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which it was made, and substituted the proposition that obligations
should not be implied into a contract. 183 The dissent relied on the
tenet that a contract must have a purpose even if that purpose is not
expressed. If the purpose of the conveyance was mineral production,
a complete failure to pursue that purpose constitutes abandonment,
which terminates the estate. 184
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE. HOLDING

The issue presented in Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises,Inc. is whether
the assignee of part of an oil lease who has drilled and produced one
well - and has since abandoned the well and the oil business altogether - can retain ownership of the minerals in place thirty years
later by virtue of production by another party somewhere outside the
assigned tract, but on the property covered by the base lease.1 85 The
ultimate issue, of course, is who has title to the mineral interest. To
answer that question, we must look to the original conveyances and
determine what interest is conveyed and what, limitations there may
be on such a conveyance.
A.

The base lease has some attributes of a modern form lease.

The court reporters gave very little information regarding the terms
of the base lease. Apparently, the document was a fairly typical mineral lease stipulating that the interest would terminate and revert to
the grantor when production of minerals from the tract ceased. Provisions in the document allowed assignment of the lease. The document
may have included an assignment clause similiar to that in AAPL
Form 675.186

The rights of each party hereunder may be assigned in whole or in
part, and the provisions hereof shall extend to their heirs, successors
.and assigns, but no change or division in the ownership of the land,
rentals or royalties, however accomplished shall operate to enlarge
the obligations, or diminish the rights of the Lessee.... In the event

of assignment hereof in whole or in part, liability for breach of any
obligation issued hereunder shall rest exclusively upon the owner of
this Lease, or portion thereof who commits such breach .... In the

event of an assignment of this Lease as to a segregated portion of
said land, the rentals payable hereunder shall be apportioned as between the several leasehold owners [and] ... default in rental pay183. Id. (Hightower, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 770-71 (Hightower, J., dissenting).
185. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc, 775 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987),
rev'd and remanded, 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989); 852 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993) (on remand), rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).

186. This form, provided by the American Association of Petroleum Landmen
(AAPL), is a common modem form lease. EUGENE 0. KuNTz ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW
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ments by one shall not affect the rights of other leasehold owners
hereunder. 87
If the assignment provision in the base lease resembled the paragraph above, there is an argument the courts did not consider regarding Western's obligations under the assignment. The Rogers group
was eager to adopt the theory that Western stepped into the shoes of
Superior regarding the 329.3 acres assigned.18 8 For reasons discussed
later, this cannot be completely true. 189 The Rogers group contended
their interest could only terminate when the base lease terminates, for
instance, when there was no longer production anywhere on the
lease.' 90
The assignment clause above indicates that an assignee's rights are
conditioned on his own performance of the lease condition. The oil
and gas lease requires production or payment of delay rentals. This
clause directly addresses the effect of default by a holder of a segregated portion. 19' According to the AAPL 675 assignment clause, the
failure of an assignee to pay rentals will not act to affect the rights of
other assignees. The language of the paragraph indicates that failure
to pay delay rentals will affect the rights of the defaulting assignee. The
paragraph does not state that the assignee is liable, which might appear to create a mere covenant.
The terms of this form lease cannot be imputed directly to the Dean
lease. However, this form lease is an example of a typical lease used
today, developed over many years to reflect the intent of parties to an
oil and gas lease. It incorporates terms that satisfy the needs of the
industry and attempts to comply with prior decisions of the courts.
The Dean base lease contained a clause stipulating that if the lease
was at any time separated into individual tracts, the lease would still
be considered as one for the purposes of the base agreement. 92 The
provision for consideration of the severed tracts as one appeared to
serve the purpose of the modern-day pooling clause. It allowed the
property conveyed by the base lease to be held by production anywhere on the lease. A typical pooling clause is in AAPL Form 675:
Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and power to voluntarily pool or combine the acreage covered by this Lease, or any
portion thereof, as to the oil and gas, or either of them, with other
land, lease or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof to the extent

hereinafter stipulated, when in Lessee's judgment it is necessary or
advisable to do so in order to properly develop and operate said
leased premises in compliance with the Spacing Rules of the Rail187. Id. at 13.
188. Ricane, 852 S.W.2d at 755.
189. See infra part IV B.1.

190. Ricane, 852 S.W.2d at 755.
191. KUNTZ, ET AL., supra note 186.
192. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1989).
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road Commission of Texas, or other lawful authorities, or when to
do so would, in the judgment of Lessee, promote the conservation
of oil and gas from said premises .... Operations for drilling on or
production of oil or gas from any part of the pooled unit composed
in whole or in part of the land covered by this Lease, . . . shall be
considered as operations for drilling on or production of oil or gas
from the land covered by this Lease whether or not the well or wells
are actually located on the premises covered by this Lease, and the
entire acreage constituting such unit or units, as to oil and gas or
either of them as herein provided, shall be treated
1 93 for all purposes
... as if the same were included in this Lease.

The pooling clause' 94 allows the lessee to pool other smaller tracts
to comply with state spacing rules or conservation laws. When single
operators would waste money drilling on tracts with limited reserves
below, they are permitted to pool other tracts so that they may draw
oil using a single well so as to make their operations cost effective. It
follows if separate tracts are assigned to different operators, drilling
by one should hold the lease when drilling by each would be wasteful.
However, a Pugh clause'95 acts to partially negate a pooling clause.

A Pugh clause modifies the usual pooling language to provide that
or production from a pooled unit will not hold the entire
operations
19 6
lease.

Unfortunately, the Ricane courts have not published the full terms
of the base lease. 97 Nonetheless, one can reasonably assume the
clause stipulating that severed tracts would be considered as one for
the purpose of production was198meant to assure efficient production by
the lessee or lessee's assigns.
Paragraph four of the AAPL Form 675 indicates pooling is allowed:
(1) when the lessee determines it is necessary for proper operation
and development; (2) when spacing rules require it; and (3) when the
lessee determines it is necessary for conservation purposes. However,
193. KuNTz, ET AL., supra note 186, at 12-13.
194. For a general discussion of pooling see LoWE, supra note 8, at 242-56.
195. A Pugh clause is a specific provision that lands outside the unit will not be held
by production within the unit. Such clauses segregate the lands under the lease
outside the unit from the lands included in the unit for purposes of payment of delay
rentals or perpetuation by unit production or both. HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 7.13
at 442. See also Friedrich v. Amoco Produc. Co., 698 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Pugh clause is named for Lawrence G. Pugh, a
lawyer in Crowley, Louisiana. In 1947, he "drafted a clause calculated to prevent the
holding of non-pooled acreage in his client's lease while certain portions of the lease
acreage were being held under pooled arrangements." Id. at 752 n.1.
196. HEMINGWAY, supra note 8, § 7.13 at 442.
197. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 852 S.W.2d 751, 754-55 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993), rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
198. The Rogers group refers to the Dean lease as a "modem form oil and gas
lease." Petitioner's Reply To Respondents' Motion for Rehearing at 8. (Since the
base lease has no pooling clause and the Rogers group contends the lease is a modem
form lease, we can assume the stipulation acts as a pooling clause.)
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pooling is intentional and at the discretion of the lessee since indiscriminate pooling is not allowed.' 99
Assuming the purpose of the Dean lease provision was like a pooling clause, the lease would be held by production in the event the
lessee had segregated tracts for efficiency or conservation purposes.
The Rogers group asked the court to consider their tract held by production although their failure to continue production acted to contravene the purpose for which the land was segregated. 0° Without more
information on the language of the base lease, further conjecture on
this issue serves no purpose.
B. The Superior to Western assignment resembles a farmout
agreement20 ' and a partialassignment.
The court supplied us with the language of the assignment that it
considered significant. Paragraph one was the granting clause and
contained a condition for termination. Paragraph two caused the
greatest controversy. Paragraph two stated in part, "Western shall
and hereby does assume and agree to perform and discharge all of the
[Dean] lease obligations, express or implied. ' 20 2 Rogers and the
Texas Supreme Court agreed this is a covenant to perform the obligations of the base lease.20 3 Furthermore, the court recognized it was an
agreement to perform only the covenants of the base lease. 0 4 Ricane
argued this paragraph required Western to be bound by the condition
in the base lease to produce oil and gas. 05
Considering the language of the lease alone, the question revolves
around the meaning of assume. The paragraph did not merely create
a promise to perform the duties, but also indicated that Western
would assume the lease obligations. Such literal construction could
199. KuNT-z,

ET AL.,

supra note 186, at 12-13.

200. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 775 S.W.2d 391, 394-95 (Tex. App.-Amarillo

1987), rev'd, 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989).
201. Farmout agreements offer an opportunity for a third party to earn an
assignment of mineral interests from the lessee. Because of its informality, the
farmout agreement can prove a trap for the unwary. Richard Hemingway describes it
this way:
[Tihe term farmout is generally used to describe a transaction where the
owner of an oil and gas lease (called the farmor) agrees to an assignment of
a part of a lease to one (called the farmee) who agrees, as consideration for

the assignment, to drill a well to a certain depth or condition.... Although
it seems more common now than in the past to have a present assignment
executed prior to drilling by the farmee, for tax purposes the assignment can
be made either before or after performance of the agreement by the farmee.
Richard W. Hemingway, The Farmout Agreement: A Story Short But Not Always

Sweet, 1 NAT.

RESOURCES

& ENV'T 3, 3 (1985).

202. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 852 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993), rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).

203. Ricane, 884 S.W.2d at 765.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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indicate a true assignment of rights and delegation of duties. If, as
Rogers argued, Western stepped into Superior's shoes and benefited
directly from Superior's segregation or production decisions, it follows
that Superior's failure to pay delay rentals likewise terminated the
lease as to Western.
Construing this provision in light of the lease's purpose is more
likely to lead to Ricane's conclusion that Western assumed the condition of continued production with respect to its portion of the lease.
Neither construction alone is very satisfying or without fault.
Paragraph five provided for abandonment by Western:
In the event that production of oil... is developed on the above
described lease premises by Western, and Western desires to abandon or cease operating the same, Western shall notify Superior...
and Superior, may at its election, require Western to transfer ... all
of Western's right, title and interest inand [sic] to said lease .... 206
The court's analysis of paragraph five of the assignment was inadequate. The language of paragraph five indicates a second condition
for termination of the assignment. The paragraph incorporates words
that command action by the assignee and creates an option in the assignor. Western shall notify Superior and Superior may, at its election,
require Western to transfer all of its right.20 7 The abandonment condition triggered Western's notice responsibility and Superior's opportunity to regain the mineral rights. There is no language to indicate that
Superior's option was anything but automatic upon abandonment by
Western. It was not contingent on proper written notification of abandonment, or even on actual abandonment. The mere decision to
abandon or cease production triggered the option.
Paragraph seven seems merely to provide for Western's obligation
to deliver a sufficient deed upon termination.2 °8 It indicates that
Western's failure to deliver such deed would not operate to prevent
the termination or reversion of such rights to Superior.
When analyzing the Superior to Western assignment under the rules
adopted by the Texas Supreme Court, the particular terms of the instrument may be used to determine the intent of the parties and the
purpose. The nature of the conveyance itself may also indicate the
intent of the parties in addition to creating an inseparable duty. Furthermore, the four corners alone may be-sufficient when used to interpret an unambiguous document,2 09 or one can use any of the canons
of construction developed by the courts.
206.
207.
208.
1993),
209.

Id. at 755.
Id
Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 852 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
Munsey v. Marnet Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 311, 314 (Tex. 1923).
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1. The assignment terminated under its express terms.
Even when applying the most restrictive Peveto four corners rule,21°
the assignment as a whole created two express conditions for termination. The first is the failure to drill a well in the prescribed amount of
time. The second is the decision to abandon production. 211 There is
no substitute for performance that will enable the assignment to survive either of these occurrences.
2. The assignment terminated when it failed to
advance the intent of the parties.
Applying any of the more liberal methods of interpretation creates
even more compelling arguments for termination. Paragraph two of
the assignment expressed the purpose of the assignment.
To this end (referring to assuming the obligations of the lease), it
is recognized by the parties hereto.., that there are now a number
of ... off-set wells which Western shall protect against by the drilling of properly located wells on the above described land, in due
and proper time, and subject to all of the applicable provisions of
this agreement.212
In order for Western to assume the obligations of the lease, it was
required to protect against drainage by drilling wells at appropriate
locations.21 3 By using the word shall instead of may, Superior indicated once again that protection against drainage was a requirement,
not an option, of the assignment.
3. The assignment terminated when it no longer served the
purpose of a mineral assignment.
Intent of the parties is evident not by what the document says but
by what the document is. An oil and gas lease and its assignments
exist for the purpose of production of minerals.214 If a person merely
wishes to transfer an interest in minerals to another he could do so by
executing a royalty deed or a mineral deed.2 5 The unique nature of a
mineral lease is in the bargain that is struck between the lessor and the
lessee. By executing a lease, the lessor-land owner conveys an interest
to the lessee in exchange for the lessee's expertise and ability to reduce the minerals in place to possession. The sole purpose of their
agreement is profit from production.
210. Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982) (citing Rutherford v. Randal, 593 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. 1980)).
211. Ricane, 852 S.W.2d at 755.
212. Id. at 754-55.
213. Id.
214. LoWE, supra note 8, at 194.
215. Id. at 38-39, 44-45, 60-61.
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Absent any other indication of purpose, the assignment of the 329.3
acres of the Dean lease to Western was unquestionably for the purpose of continued production and development. It is difficult to imagine what consideration would be adequate to cause Superior to agree
to release a portion of an otherwise producing lease for an indefinite
period without expecting production.
4. The assignment terminated under the restricted
interpretation of the Davis doctrine.
The language of the assignment, its express purpose, and the nature
of the instrument itself, each seem to provide an adequate basis for
determining the lease terminated on its own terms. Even if these theories are rejected, the Davis doctrine may still be applied. The Davis
doctrine allows for termination of a mineral lease upon complete
abandonment of the lease's purpose.2 16 To apply the doctrine, consideration must be given to the meaning of abandonment and the purpose of the lease.
Although the Rogers group and the Texas Supreme Court relied on
the tenet that an estate in land cannot be abandoned in Texas, 117 the
concept is not as simple as it seems. The Davis doctrine does not provide for abandonment of the estate, but instead allows termination of
the interest by abandonment of the purpose for which the fee was
created.218
The Supreme Court of Texas refused to apply the Davis doctrine
because the document lacked an expression of the purpose of the assignment.2 19 The court did not directly address the implied purpose of
a mineral lease, which has been reiterated numerous times in the past
century. Instead, the court declared that for Davis to apply, the purpose of the
assignment needed to be clearly expressed in the
220
document.
The Superior to Western assignment clearly required Western to
drill offset wells to prevent drainage. Additionally, adopting the base
lease, which expressly stated development and production of minerals
to be its purpose, 2 was sufficient to make the purpose of the assignment clear. By requiring an express purpose in the assignment itself,
the Texas Supreme Court severely restricted the Davis doctrine and
implicitly restricted interpretation of mineral conveyances. The Ricane decision, when read in conjunction with Sun Exploration & Pro216. Ricane, 852 S.W.2d at 758.

217. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989).
218. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. 1994).
219. Id at 767.
220. Id.
221. I& at 764.
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duction Co. v. Jackson,22 2 signals an erosion of the enforceability of
implied covenants in Texas oil and gas leases.
Because the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply the Davis doctrine, the abandonment issue was immaterial. The issue would have
been material if the court had determined that paragraph five created
a condition for termination as well as an element of abandonment of
purpose. The evidence indicating abandonment of operations was
clear. According to trial court testimony, Western forfeited its corporate charter in 1965; its records were lost; its shareholder ledger was
lost; its president executed instruments purporting to dispose of the
assignment; its lease records were placed in an unprotected warehouse; Western kept no contact with the premises; the shareholders
and their descendants asserted they had no contact and no way of
knowing what was going on with the property; and the person charged
by the shareholders with responsibility for winding up the corporation's affairs had the sole intent of paying the IRS and "getting the
hell out of Dodge" 223 If under any method of interpretation, the assignment could have failed through Western's abandonment of production, the occurrences described would have satisfied the
requirements.
The implication of the court's holding with regard to Western is that
the only way Western's fee could be defeased is by termination of the
entire lease, failure of its express condition, permanent cessation of
production, or under a conditional decree. Superior could have
sought a conditional decree to force Western to comply with the express and implied covenants of its assignment or forfeit its interest.
From Superior's perspective, this would have been an unreasonable
224
action. Western was defunct and its shareholder roster was lost.

Thus, Superior had no reasonably effective way to reach the successors in interest. The company president had already executed what
might suffice as an adequate quitclaim deed. Superior was certain the
result of such a suit would be forfeiture by Western. Why waste its
time and money when it already had an operator producing under a
title that was at least a good business risk?
Petitioners' response to Respondent's Motion for Rehearing suggested that Superior's recourse was through the Texas statute for receiver of mineral interests.225 This. mechanism provides for minerals
to be reacquired by Superior through receivership after demonstration of a diligent effort to contact all parties in interest to the assign222. 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989) (holding there is no duty to explore independent of
the duty to develop).

223.
1993),
224.
225.

Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 852 S.W.2d 751, 762 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
Id.
TEX. Ov.PRAc. & REM. CODE AN. § 64.091 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
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ment. The same arguments against Superior spending time and
money on the action for a conditional decree apply to this remedy.
Ricane should have acquired title through adverse possession.
Texas, like most states, provides several means for a hostile possessor
to acquire title.226
Title by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by theft
or robbery, a primitive method of acquiring land without paying for
it.-... It has been suggested ... that the policy is to reward those

using the land in a way beneficial to the community. This takes too
much account of the individual case. The statute has not for its object to reward the diligent trespasser for his wrong nor yet to penalize the negligent and dormant owner for sleeping upon his rights;
the great purpose is automatically to quiet all titles which are openly
and consistently asserted, to provide
proof of meritorious titles, and
227
correct errors in conveyancing.
As Oliver Wendall Holmes so succinctly stated, "Sometimes it is
said that if a man neglects to enforce his rights,
he cannot complain if,
''228
after a while, the law follows his example.
When the Texas Supreme Court first reversed Ricane, it stated there
was insufficient evidence in the record to award summary
judgment
229 Ricane
apfor Ricane Enterprises based on adverse possession.
peared to have had its best, but certainly not its only ground for recovery dismissed.
Ricane held under color of title. It held under a chain of transfers
that was not regular for want of proper recordation, and whose defect
did not want of intrinsic fairness or honesty. Ricane held through a
partial assignment from Superior Oil. Superior conveyed the interest
it reacquired through termination of Western's partial assignment.
The commemoration of this reversion Was by Campbell's quitclaim
deed. Certainly these transfers in the, chain were not without defect,
but they were based on the good faith belief that Western's interest
had terminated, therefore they did not want for intrinsic fairness or
honesty.
Certainly Ricane occupied the property in an open, visible, exclusive, and continous manner. Though the Rogers group claimed lack of
notice, constructive notice could certainly have been established in accordance with the-rule of O.K.C. Corp. v. Allen. 230 Moreover, Rogers
might have argued lack of the requisite intent for adverse possession.
However, as held in Arnold v. Evans,23 1 intent to possess under the
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024-.030 (Vernon 1986).
Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135

226. TEX. CIv.

227.
(1918).
228.
229.
230.

Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897).
Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989).
O.K.C. Corp. v. Allen, 574 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978,

writ ref'd n.r.e.).

231. Arnold v. Evans, 140 S.W. 497, 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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mistaken belief that one holds rightfully is adequate to uphold the
adverse possessor's claim.232
The Texas Supreme Court erred in reversing the trial and appellate
courts in its Rogers v. Ricane decisions. Applying the traditional rules
of construction that attempt to determine the intent of the parties, the
court, faced with the indisputable expression of the assignment as a
whole and the nature of the transaction, defied logic in upholding
Western's title to the minerals under the assignment. Western's title
fails under the express terms of paragraph five of the assignment, the
adopted purpose of the lease, and the elements of the Davis doctrine
as case law has traditionally construed it.
The remedies suggested by the court are not only impractical, but
also apply to Superior, not Ricane. z33 Ricane's alternative would be
to forfeit what appeared to be a good business risk and leave Superior
without means to fulfill its obligation as a reasonable prudent operator to prevent drainage. Where the typical assignment provision of a
lease stipulates that the assignment does not act to enlarge the obligations nor diminish the rights of the lessee, Western's cessation of production, in the absence of automatic termination of the assignment,
appears to increase the lessee's obligations. Superior is burdened by
the newly implied obligation to file suit to terminate Western's assignment in order to comply with its covenant to prevent drainage and
operate properly. The court did implicitly what it continually rejected
explicitly. It created an implied obligation where none existed, and
where such an obligation was expressly prohibited.
C. The Property Interests
It is undisputed that the Dean lease conveyed a fee simple determinable. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the assignment cannot be
resolved without discussing the mineral interest it conveys.
1. The assignment conveyed a fee simple determinable
followed by an executory interest.
If the assignment merely conveyed a piece of the fee simple determinable, as the court and the Rogers group seem to imply, upon occurrence of the defeasing condition, the rights would revert to the
grantor of the fee, the surface owner. This is not what the assignment
said. Upon termination the assignment would revert to Superior. 3
What kind of interest has been conveyed?
The interest conveyed to Western included two express defeasing
conditions, the failure to drill a well and the decision to cease opera232. Id.

233. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 768 (Tex. 1994).
234. Id. at 766.
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tions. Either one caused the interest to revest in Superior.2 3 5 Alternatively, if production on the entire lease ceased, the interest revested in
Superior, and then in the lessor through Superior. Since Western
owned less than Superior, it could not own a fee.
The assignment could convey merely a license or right to take minerals from the property. However, this determination flies in the face
of Texas' ownership in place theory. Another possibility is that the
interest created was a term interest. The interest would vest upon
drilling the initial well and would last as long as Western did not abandon. In this case, Western would have a term interest followed by
Superior's contingent remainder in a fee simple determinable in the
minerals beneath the assigned tract. Superior would have a future interest and the lessor would continue to hold a possibility of reverter in
the entire lease.
The remaining possibility is that Western's interest in a fee simple
determinable vested upon drilling the initial well. 3 6 When a present
interest or a vested remainder created in a transferee is subject to
complete defeasance by the operation of an executory limitation, the
future interest displacing the defeated interest is an executory interest. 3 7 In the present case, Western's interest was subject to defeasance should Western decide to cease operations on the tract.
Superior's future interest was executory.
Executory interests are subject to the rule against perpetuities
which prevents remote vesting.2 38 The policy behind the rule is to encourage free alienability of interests by eliminating the possibility of
remote vesting.239 In this case, the rule against perpetuities would
prevent remote vesting of Superior's interest.
2. The executory interest is subject to the
rule against perpetuities.
If the assignment conveyed a fee simple determinable in the minerals beneath the 329.3 acres to Western, followed by an executory interest in Superior, that interest would be subject to the rule against
perpetuities. The rule would require the interest to vest or fail in Superior within twenty-one years of lives in being at the time of the
grant. Since corporations have no lives in being, 240 a strict twenty-one
years would apply. Some jurisdictions employ a wait and see policy,
allowing the parties to wait and see if the interest vests within the
235. See supra notes 157, 159, 161 and accompanying text. The base lease will be
treated as one unit if the tracts are separated. Production anywhere on the lease will
save the assignment from termination. Likewise, failure to produce anywhere on the
lease will terminate the lease.
236. Ricane, 884 S.W.2d at 766.
237. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 43, § 3.11.
238. Id at 127.
239. Id
240. TEX. Bus. Cop. Acr ANN. art. 2.02A(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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perpetuities period before testing its validity.24 ' The interest could
vest in Superior only upon Western's failure to drill the initial well or
upon Western's decision to abandon according to paragraph five.2 42
Texas employs the cy pres doctrine, which allows the court to reform
the grant so that it does not violate the rule against perpetuities. 43 In
the alternative, any term that violates the rule against perpetuities will
be stricken from the grant under common law. "
Likewise, the assignment could have created a springing executory
interest from Superior to Western. The vesting of the springing interest would occur upon Western's drilling of the initial well. Since that
event may not occur within twenty-one years of the original grant, the
Superior to Western assignment would be void.
3. If the assignment terminated under its own terms,
the executory interest did not violate the rule
against perpetuities; if the assignment did not
terminate, the executory interest is invalid.
Evidence indicates that Western decided to abandon its production
as early as 1961 and no later than 1965.245 According to the executory
interest theory, the interest vested in Superior prior to the expiration
of the perpetuities period. If it had not, the executory interest could
have failed and Western arguably would have a fee simple determinable in the minerals beneath the 329.3 acres covered by the assignment.
This is probably more than Superior intended to convey in the first
place. Unfortunately, the Texas statute permitting application of the
cy pres doctrine applies only to instruments that took effect after September 1, 1969.
4. Property law need not be rewritten to accommodate
partial assignments.
Texas courts should consider a theory of oil and gas conveyance that
recognizes the particular properties of ownership in place and the ageold principles of property law. The oil and gas lease conveys a fee
simple determinable in oil beneath the surface. However, a partial
assignment creates a right to use. The farmee2 47 who earns an assign241. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 43, at 135.
242. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 321-22 (3d ed. 1993).

243. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon 1991).
244. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 242, at 300.
245. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 852 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993), rev'd, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1984) (Carrie Dean B No. 1 ceased production. No
more drilling took place thereafter. The State forfeited Western's charter in 1965
after Western conveyed its interests in the operation.).
246. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1995); Casa View Assembly of God Church v. Williams, 414 S.W.2d 697, 701-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1967, no writ) (where the Texas Constitution prohibits perpetuities and there is no
statute on the subject, the common law is the law of the land).
247. The FarmoutAgreement, supra note 201.
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ment by drilling acquires the right to remove the minerals from the
lease, whereas the underlying fee belongs to the assignor and reverts
to him upon abandonment. A fee owner has the right to grant such
profits and does not risk over-conveyance or loss of rights through
creating interests that may vest too remotely. A profit may be abandoned. When it is, the owner of the fee retains his interest. Today,
when so many domestic oil companies are in trouble, it seems public
policy would support a system which provides for termination of an
interest without protracted court proceedings.
In Freeman v. Magnolia the court indicated that minerals vested
when reduced to possession.248 This is a theory adopted in most right
to take jurisdictions, and one that Texas courts hinted at earlier. 24 9 An
alternate theory would be that the assignment conveyed a sublease.
Traditionally, a sublease is a present possessory interest carved out of
the lease. The subtenant is not in privity of estate with the landlord
but is in privity with the head tenant. The subtenant has a direct landlord/tenant relationship with the head tenant but not with the landlord. Termination of the head tenancy will cause failure of the
subtenancy. 250 Applying the sublease theory, the subtenant could retain possession for the term (as long as he did not decide to abandon)
so long as he complied with the covenants of the agreement.
5. There are other solutions for Ricane.
Finally, Ricane arguably has acquired an, easement by prescription
to capture the minerals. Easements differ from profits in that they
apply to unowned resources. Courts have applied easements to the
acquisition of wild animals and water, both of which are subject to the
rule of capture.251 Ricane captured the oil which migrated from an
undetermined location under the ground. If Ricane could establish
the elements of prescription, which are similar to the elements of adverse possession (continuous, open, notorious, adverse and exclusive
use), it might defend the conversion action - which has not yet been
heard on the ground that they captured the unowned oil through a
prescriptive easement.
V.

CONCLUSION

252

Rogers v. Ricane gives the reader an opportunity to survey the
enigmatic world of the oil and gas lease and related documents and
the sometimes bizarre world of oil and gas law. Ricane was wrongly
decided. It allowed Rogers to recover not by the fruits of its labors,
but because of inadequate drafting and inaccurate interpretation. It
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

171 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. 1943).
See Stephens v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923).
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 43, at 390.
Id. at 439.
884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994).
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penalized Ricane, which invested time and money and did a better job
of living up to its end of the oil and gas bargain. The remedies the
court suggested are remedies Ricane could not have sought and which
Superior had little motive to seek. Moreover, those remedies would
seem to unnecessarily expend judicial resources.
One might speculate there is some secondary agenda supporting the
decision in Rogers v. Ricane. There are indications that courts may
begin to dispense with implied covenants. Some of these covenants
have already found expression in modern day oil and gas leases. Making express what was once implied will certainly create work for lawyers and probably for the courts as well. However, it is inconceivable
why we should use instruments drafted in the late forties to limit today's implied covenants. Discerning the intent of the parties must be
done according to the circumstances existing when the instrument was
drafted. 153 Apparently Western understood what its obligations were
under the assignment from Superior. The fact that its shareholders'
representative had no interest in liquidating the mineral interest indicated he recognized Western no longer had a valid interest in the
lease. That recognition alone would at least seem to indicate that the
purpose of the assignment was continued production. It would also
indicate abandonment.
The imposition or denial of implied obligations often reflects public
policy at the time the case comes before the court. In Sun Exploration
& Productionv. Jackson,254 it is easy to see that the court was hesitant
to impose an additional duty on an oil company in light of the economic realities of the time. However, what policy the Texas Supreme
Court might have sought to advance by denying Ricane's access to the
Davis doctrine is difficult to imagine.
Arguments regarding certainty of title could support either advocates for the Rogers group, or advocates for Ricane. Amici for both
sides predicted disaster in the event the court found for the opposition. The court created uncertainty for anyone who has come into
possession of a mineral interest by anything other than clear warranty
deed. This is almost everyone in the oil and gas industry.
Texas must recognize it can remain an ownership in place state and
create relative certainty of title only by instituting some statutory
guidelines. Although it still requires significant effort by the receiver
and court action, receivership of minerals is a good start. Indeed, a
dormant minerals statute, a statutory "Pugh clause, 255 a right to use,
or the courts' recognition of partial assignments as creating an interest

253. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983).
254. 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1990).
255. Supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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less than a fee, would act to support public policy of mineral development and waste avoidance.
Dayna Ferebee
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